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-1-1. INTRODUCTION
Economists have long been interested in policy issues in which households make inefficient
choices. A well-researched example is pollution in which an individual considers only her own benefit
from her action and ignores the consequences of her action on others. An important policy issue is
whether the individual’s action is better controlled indirectly by changing the price (usually implemented
by imposing a tax) or directly by limiting the quantity of the activity. With full information the two
approaches are equivalent. However, when the government has less than full information, economists
have traditionally stressed that there is likely to be an advantage in using the indirect or price route.
1
Our research considers the case of the smoking, which the government wishes to limit because of
the ill-health it causes. Smoking is furthermore addictive. One characteristic of the addiction is that the
smoker prefers a steady flow of cigarettes (a.k.a. nicotine) to an unsteady flow; this suggests that the
individual’s utility from cigarettes may be modeled as having mean-variance form. If the government
uses a price policy to reduce smoking, it levies a tax on cigarettes.  However, the ability of the
government to increase the tax on cigarettes to punitive levels is limited by the ability of the smoker to
buy illegal, and untaxed, cigarettes.  Another government policy instrument is to ban smoking in the
2
workplace, or public places. This policy works through the variance term. Although the smoker is able to
offset the reduction of cigarettes he would otherwise smoke during the work period by increasing the
cigarettes smoked at home, the forced elimination of cigarettes smoked at work creates an unsteady flow
of nicotine, increasing the variance and making smoking less attractive. The overall effect is to reduce the
number of cigarettes smoked. In our model, in which the government’s use of taxes is limited, we show
that the price policy and the smoking ban policy are not equivalent, and that the best policy always
includes a smoking ban.
While smoking is our central consideration, we believe that the theory may be applied in many
-2-cases in which the government considers the product to be “a bad” (rather than a “good”) and wishes to
limit the extent to which the product is consumed.  In addition to smoking bans at the workplace (or at
restaurants or other public places), our theory explains licensing laws which limit alcohol purchases to
particular times and laws which criminalize drugs, making their supply uncertain.
We believe our model is more general than the specific assumptions we make. We  model
addiction as a dislike of daily variance. In the classic “rational addiction” model of Becker and Murphy
(1988), addiction implies that the utility flow from consumption depends on the accumulated stock of
past consumption. While our model ignores this particular aspect of addiction, our results still apply. A
workplace ban, by increasing the daily variance, makes smoking less attractive every day; therefore less
cigarettes are smoked in each period, decreasing the accumulated stock of past consumption evaluated at
a future date and improving future health. 
Our government is paternalistic: it wants to limit smoking because smokers incorrectly perceive
the ill-effects of smoking on their health. Of course there are other reasons the government may wish to
limit smoking, prominent among them being the externality created by “second-hand” smoke. Apart from
misperceiving the health impacts of smoking, smokers may smoke because they suffer from time
inconsistency (Gruber and Koszegi (2004)) or projection bias (O’Donohue and Rabin (2001)), or they
may make decision errors as a result of being exposed to certain cues (Bernheim and Rangell (2004)), or
because they succumb to temptation (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001). This literature is reviewed extensively
in Dela Vigna (2009). To maintain simplicity, the model development is based on the perceived costs of
smoking: some individuals overestimate the costs while others underestimate. Viscusi (1990) gives
credence to the idea that many non smokers actually overestimate health risks. What is critical in our
model is that the smoker dislikes variance and that the government wants to limit smoking.  Finally, we
use the possibility of smokers switching to untaxed but illegal cigarettes as a device to limit the ability of
the government to tax cigarettes. Another model might have political reasons or tax competition (as in de
-3-Bartolome (2007)) preventing the government from setting taxes which are arbitrarily high. Whatever the
devise, the government is unable to completely eliminate smoking by setting a punitive tax rate.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on smoking bans. Section
3 introduces the model by describing an individual’s smoking decision and the reason for government’s
concern over the smoking level. Section 4 shows the effect of a smoking ban when cigarettes are untaxed.
Section 5 shows how the potential to buy untaxed but illegal cigarettes limits the government’s ability to
reduce smoking using the tax instrument alone. Section 6 undertakes a positive discussion when the
government simultaneously uses a tax and a smoking ban. Section 7 shows that the smoking ban is
always a useful instrument by which to control smoking, even when the tax can be set optimally. Section
8 discusses the long-run consequences of a ban. Section 9 concludes
2.  LITERATURE ON GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS SMOKING
Bans on the use of tobacco in public and work places are widespread in all developed economies
at the present time. They take many forms and are enacted by municipal, state/provincial and federal
governments. They extend not only to the workplace, but also to the five B’s (bars, bingo halls, bowling
alleys, betting establishments, and billiard halls). Local governments frequently impose more restrictions
than are required by higher-level legislation.
Prior to the 1990s, taxes were the main instrument by which governments sought to  reduce
tobacco use. Some of the earliest municipal ordinances were enacted in California around 1990 (see
Moskowitz et al, 2000). The modern era has seen governments develop a larger array of anti-tobacco
armaments: in addition to bans, health warnings on tobacco packages now appear in many countries,
advertising of tobacco products has been severely curtailed; sponsorship of sports events by tobacco
companies has been restricted and store displays have been outlawed.  
-4-In part bans have been introduced out of the recognition that the effectiveness of ever higher
taxes is limited, on account of the incentive these latter provide for illegal production and trans-border
shipment. For example, as of end 2007, approximately one third of cigarettes sold in Canada were
supplied illegally. Additionally, bans are seen as a distinct measure in the fight against tobacco use, a
measure that impacts the user in a different manner and that can therefore supplement the role of price
disincentives. The group of non-price disincentives noted above form what is now termed the public
health move to ‘denormalize’ smoking. 
A substantive empirical literature documents the impact of smoking bans, and many econometric
papers that estimate the impact of tax/price measures attempt to control for the impact of bans. Numerous
studies have found lower tobacco prevalence and quantity in workplaces covered by complete or partial
bans (Chapman et al, 1999, Fichtenberg and Glantz, 2002, or Gagné, 2008). While such correlations
could reflect a choice of workplace in a high labor turnover economy, Evans, Farrelly and Montgomery
(1998) controlled for the possible endogeneity of the choice of work place, and still found that bans
reduced tobacco use. Furthermore, Cutler and Glaeser (2007) propose that smoking reductions achieved
through bans may have a social multiplier impact.
While health groups universally support the implementation and extension of strictures on
smoking, some research has been less than fully supportive. For example, Adams and Cotti (2008)
propose that bans in bars have been found to encourage patrons to seek out bars in adjoining jurisdictions
where smoking is not banned, with the consequence that road and vehicle accident rates increase as a
result of driving further under the influence of some amount of alcohol.
The strength of bans (and the level of taxes) varies widely, depending upon the degree of anti-
tobacco ‘sentiment’ in the jurisdiction in question (e.g. deCicca et al 2006). Sentiment against tobacco
control is stronger in states or regions where tobacco is grown. For example, Kentucky and the Carolinas
have lower tax rates on cigarettes than Massachusetts, because tobacco is a means of livelihood for many
-5-in the former states. At the same time, anti-tobacco sentiment may translate into more widespread bans
on public place use.
Public policy interventions against smoking have received support from several recent theoretical
developments (referenced above) that have addressed the implications of deviations from the
assumptions of the traditional utility-maximizing model - time inconsistency, projection bias, the
presence of cues and temptations. In the case of time inconsistency, problems arise because it is only in
future periods that the negative consequences of current actions materialize, and a high discount rate
applied to immediate decisions undervalues those consequences relative to a lower long-run discount
rate. With projection bias, users miscalculate the future negative impacts associated with today’s
consumption. Cues are capable of triggering mistakes on the part of the brain's decision mechanism and
temptation is important when the brain is subject to multiple decision modes. These models all stand in
contrast to the rational addiction approach, where there is no role for a government in correcting
individual decisions - unless externalities are present. 
A critical element in smoking bans is the degree to which they induce substitution in time-of-day
smoking: if individuals are restricted in the hours during which they are permitted to smoke, do such
restrictions imply that smoking will fall (roughly) in line with the reduction in the proportion of the day
during which smoking is not permitted? Or will substitution take place towards other non-restricted times
of the day? Adda and Cornaglia (2007) propose that public-place smoking bans have led to an increase in
the amount of smoking in the home, and that this in turn has increased the amount of second-hand smoke
to which children and other non-smokers are exposed. Thus, substitution possibilities are critical. The
model we develop in the next section permits smokers to increase their nicotine intake during non-
restricted periods of the day in response to the imposition of a workplace ban. 
Two final comments are in order before developing the model. First, we do not focus upon the
possible impacts of second hand smoke in our welfare analysis; we are concerned with the well being of
-6-the aggregate of individual utilities where errors may be made as a result of incorrect priors on the health
impact of smoking. An enormous literature exists in the medical journals on second hand smoke. Second,
we do not introduce the complexity of ‘intending quitters’, who may favor bans because they are a type
of commitment device (Gruber and Mullainathan, 2005 or Hersch, 2005).  
3.  THE MODEL
We introduce our model by considering the case when the government potentially imposes a tax
on cigarettes but there is no ban. Smoking is addictive in both the long-run and in the short-run. The
long-run effect is modeled by Becker and Murphy (1988); at time T the individual’s utility from smoking
is affected by his prior history of smoking, which we denote as  Ø(T). While recognizing the long-run
effect, we choose to focus on the short-run or within-the-day effect. When a cigarette is smoked, a shot of
nicotine is released into the blood providing satisfaction to the smoker. As time moves forward within the
day, this nicotine metamorphoses into cotinine and the nicotine level in the blood declines; this decline
creates a longing to restore the nicotine to its pre-existing level and may induce the smoker to light up
another cigarette.  From the above discussion, it should be clear that within-the-day the smoker prefers a
steady stream of nicotine to an unsteady stream.  
We consider a day to have 3 periods; descriptively, the first period is the morning period before
the individual goes to work, the second period is the period during which the individual works and the
third period is the period after work. The exact number of periods is not critical provided there are at
least two, so that substitution between periods is possible. The consumption of the numeraire in the day
is x and cigarette consumption in period 1 is  , in period 2 is  and in period 3 is .The individual’s
utility in day T depends on  , on his perceived health h  and on the individual’s prior smoking
history,  , or is  . We assume a specific form for this function, viz.
-7-The term   represents the direct utility the individual achieves from smoking
1 2 3 the cigarettes c , c  and c  . We model this as having mean- variance form, with the smoker “enjoying”
the mean level of cigarettes and the smoker’s preference for a steady consumption of cigarettes being
represented as a dislike of variance:
.
The parameters a and b are positive; they are assumed to be functions of the smoking history  but,
as  is given at day T, this dependance is suppressed. 
3
Any model of smoking with policy implications must explain why people choose to smoke when
the induced health risks make it, to most outside observers, such a poor choice. The true health of the
smoker is a negative function of the cigarettes he smokes- we model this as the quadratic function
where the negative signs indicate that the health of the smoker declines with the cigarettes he smokes.
The parameters s and t are assumed to be positive and to be functions of the smoking history  but
this dependance is also suppressed. However, the ill-health caused by cigarettes occurs in the future and
so is not experienced by the individual when making his cigarette choice. In particular, the individual i
perceives his future health to be:
where á is a parameter distributed on [-1, +1 ] with mean zero. Individuals with   overestimate the
i
-8-negative effect of cigarettes on their future health (and do not smoke); individuals with 
underestimate the negative effect of cigarettes on their future health. It must be stressed that, although
individuals are making errors in their perceptions,  the error is two-sided so that there is no systematic
bias:  á has mean zero. 
i
The individual’s income is denoted M and the consumer price (which may include a tax) of a
cigarette is denoted q. The individual potentially receives a lump-sum R from the government. Hence
. Noting that the variance can be written as
 , the individual i’s problem is:
                                         
The first-order condition for the choice of  is:
either    and  ;
    or          and         
Using the symmetry of the problem,     and hence:
either       an ;d   
-9-or             and     .
This is rewritten as:
If    , the individual does not smoke:  (1) .
If    , the individual smokes:   (2)  > 0.
We denote as   the critical value of á(q) at which an individual is indifferent between not smoking
i
and buying taxed cigarettes.
DEFINITION: the perception parameter of the individual who is indifferent between not smoking and
smoking taxed cigarettes selling at consumer price q is  :
.
The demand curve of an individual with parameter  is a straight line with price sensitivity
.
Remembering that a traditional demand curve is drawn with the price on the vertical axis, the slope of the
traditional demand curve is -2(1+á)t and the vertical intercept is  . As á increases, the
i i
demand curve steepens and shifts down.
-10-Fig 1: cigarette demand for individuals with different health perceptions
We assume that smoking is a “bad” in the strict sense that an individual who correctly perceives the ill-
health does not choose to smoke even when cigarettes are untaxed or sell at their producer price p, or
i if  and q = p , c = 0
or
.
In addition, we want there to be some smokers when cigarettes are sold at their producer price, or
 or 
a - p > 0
ASSUMPTIONS:  .
-11-4.  GOVERNMENT POLICY
The government evaluates individual utility using the true effect of cigarettes on health or it
calculates the welfare associated with an individual with perception á  as:
i
           
      
where   x( á, P) is the consumption of numeraire of an individual with perception bias   under policy P
i i
and   is the consumption of cigarettes in Period 1 of an individual with perception bias   , etc.
i
We note that because the government knows the true effect of cigarettes on health, it pre-multiplies health
by 1 not (1+á) . The government calculates social welfare as the sum of all individual “true” utilities
i
under policy P.  If   is distributed on  with density f(á), social welfare W under policy P is
i
        (3)
We normalize the population size to unity. If the government policy is a cigarette tax so that the
consumer price is q, all tax revenue is returned as a lump-sum transfer R:
and
.
We explore three possible government policies:
-12-(1) a smoking ban in Period 2 where  Period 2 corresponds to the work period or to the period
when smoking by the individual can be monitored. Individuals spend Periods 1 and 3 “at
home” where their cigarette consumption cannot be monitored.
(2) a cigarette tax.  The government does not know the health perception á of the smoker and
i
it does not know the period in which the cigarette is smoked. Therefore all cigarettes must
have the same tax.
(3)  a cigarette tax plus a smoking ban.
4.  SMOKING BAN IN PERIOD 2
In this section we consider the case when the government imposes a smoking ban in Period 2. As
the rule setting    is introduced, at the pre-existing levels of  and  , there are two effects: (1)
the effect of a marginal increase in  or  on health is decreased and (2) the variance is increased. The
first effect gives the possibility of the smoker offsetting the ban by substituting into Period 1 or Period 3
cigarettes; the second effect unambiguously lowers cigarette consumption and improves health.  This is
4
formalized below.
We assume that there is no tax and hence q = p. The individual solves:
      
                                         
subject to the smoking ban:  ;
-13-2 or, substituting for c , 
.
The first-order condition is:
either    and  ;
    or          and          .
By symmetry, set  ; hence
    and   
or
    and   
We make several observations. First, comparing Equations (1) and (2) with the above, we see
that the ban does not change the value of   of the marginal smoker who is indifferent between not
smoking and smoking, or does not cause any smoker to quit.    Why is this?  Consider the change in
5
utility from the first cigarette if there is a ban:
.
-14-This is the same as if there is no ban. The variance created by the first cigarette is insufficient to deter the
smoker. Technically, as  , the variance term is going to zero “too fast”. We summarize this
observation below:
OBSERVATION 1: the smoking ban does not cause any smoker to quit.
The smoking ban in Period 2 may have the unintended consequence of inducing the smoker to
increase his smoking in Periods 1 and 3.  With no ban, the cigarettes smoked in Period 1 or 3 is:
 .
With a ban, the cigarettes smoked in Period 1 or 3 is:
.
Therefore the ban induces positive substitution into cigarettes in Periods 1 and 3 if:
 ;
or if
i.e. provided the variance term is not “too strong”.  We summarize this observation:
OBSERVATION 2: The smoking ban in Period 2 will increase the number of cigarettes smoked in
Periods 1 and 3 unless the dislike of variance is “too strong.” 
-15-However, the ban lowers the total cigarettes smoked. With no ban, the total cigarettes smoked is:
 ;
With a ban, the total cigarettes smoked is:
 .
Hence,   ensures that the ban lowers the total number of cigarettes smoked by a smoker.  This is
formalized in the observation below:
OBSERVATION 3:  The smoking ban - by increasing the variance - lowers the utility from smoking and
reduces the total number of cigarettes smoked by a smoker.
The smoking ban improves health which increases the welfare of the smoker as calculated by the
government. But it increases variance which decreases the smoker’s utility and hence the welfare of the
smoker as calculated by the government. Proposition 1 shows that the improvement in health dominates.
PROPOSITION 1: the smoking ban increases government welfare
PROOF: see Appendix A.
5.  TAX ONLY
The government would like to stop smoking. Using Inequality (2), an individual i buys cigarettes
provided    .  But  . Putting these inequalities together, some individuals
-16-are buying cigarettes provided;
or provided
. (4)
Hence, if the government can impose a sufficiently high tax, it can achieve its objective of stopping
smoking. However, we believe that the government is limited in its ability to raise the tax rate and we
model this restriction as coming from the possibility of individuals buying untaxed cigarettes on the
“black” market.
The individual can either buy legal cigarettes at consumer price q, or can buy illegal untaxed
cigarettes at a consumer price p. To participate in the illegal market, the individual must pay a fixed cost
F.  To close the model, any tax collected is returned to all individuals as a lump-sum transfer R.
We now describe the values of  as a function of q at which individuals choose not to smoke,
to smoke legal cigarettes and to smoke illegal cigarettes. If the individual buys legal cigarettes, the




-17-If the individual buys illegal cigarettes, the consumer price is p and 
;
he pays a fixed cost F (but still receives the lump-sum transfer R) and his utility is:
  (6)
DEFINITION: The individual with perception   achieves equal utility by buying in the legal and
illegal markets. 
Equating Expressions (5) and (6), we can show
 .
When q = p,  . Differentitating
 .
Imposing the condition  , we can show that
  implies    .
Intuitively, as the consumer price increases, more people buy illegal cigarettes. In addition,
-18- 
  implies    .
At    the consumer price is  , or
,
This can be solved to give
.
The associated value of  is
.
At prices exceeding  , no smokers buy legal cigarettes. The relevant comparison is between
not-smoking and smoking illegal cigarettes, and the value of  which makes the smoker indifferent
between these choices does not depend on q. 
Pulling this all together, the different    regions at which individuals do not smoke, smoke
legal cigarettes and smoke illegal cigarettes is summarized in Figure 2 below.
-19-Figure 2: the division of individuals between non-smokers, smokers of legal cigarettes 
                    and smokers of illegal cigarettes
It is straight-forward to show that  . Hence Inequality (4) is satisfied or the government is
unable to eliminate smoking by raising the tax rate.
-20-6.  COMBINATION POLICY OF TAX AND BAN: POSITIVE ANALYSIS
We are interested in comparing welfare achieved without a smoking ban with welfare achieved
with a smoking ban in the second period. In order to do calculus, we consider a partial ban in which an
individual is allowed to smoke in the second period a fraction   of the amount he smokes if there is no
ban. The analysis then considers the effect of lowering   from 1 to 0. We consider that an individual
smoking legal cigarettes is restricted to smoke    cigarettes in the second period,
;
and an individual smoking illegal cigarettes is restricted to smoke   cigarettes in the second period,
.
We note that when   it is “as if” the individual is unrestricted or there is no ban, and when   the
individual is unable to smoke cigarettes in the second period, or the ban is total. 
(i) Calculation of utility with legal purchases:
The individual’s problem is:
-21-s.t.  .
1 The first-order condition for the choice of c   is:
either   and 
           ;
or     and 
           .
By symmetry, set  , and simplifying
either    :  ;
or :    . 
Substituting into the smoker’s utility function, the utility of the legal smoker with perception    is:
i
   
-22-   .(7)
(ii) Calculation of utility with illegal purchases:
The individual’s problem is:
s.t.  .
1 After simplification, the first-order condition for the choice of c   is:
either     and 
           ;
or     and 
           .
By symmetry, set  , and hence
-23-either       and  
or           and  
Hence the utility of the illegal smoker with perception    is:
     .(8)
(iii) Calculation of 
Using Equation (7), the individual with perception parameter   achieves the same utility from




(iv) Calculation of  .
Using Equations (7) and (8), the individual with perception parameter  achieves the same
utility from smoking legal and illegal cigarettes when:
      
     
        
-25-            .
The above equation may be simplified to:
     . (9)
Equation (9) is a quadratic equation in  which can be solved. We note:
(1)  when q = p, this equation reduces to:
.
But    and hence the above equation implies
.
Therefore when q = p,   .




then  . This and   and  implies
 .
When  ,    (the legal smoker would smoke no cigarettes)  and 
 .
At larger values of q, the relevant boundary is between the non-smoker and the smoker of illegal
cigarettes.
(3) If q is held constant, differentiate Equation (9) with respect to  and rearrange:
-27-    .
Setting   :
; 
with no ban, the individual, whether smoking legal or illegal cigarettes, is indifferent to the last cigarette
smoked and hence his utility is unchanged (to a first-order) if the ban is marginally tightened  If  , 
q = p and 
;
without the ban, the individual is smoking an infinite quantity of cigarettes. The ban allows the individual
to smoke only a fraction  of the infinite quantity, or the ban is ineffective.
More generally we can show that
2 if either è = 1 or á  = -1 :    ;
otherwise:      .
Put differently, tightening the ban reduces the number of cigarettes smoked. Hence the pre-
-28-existing marginal smoker no longer finds it worthwhile to incur the cost F to buy illegal
cigarettes.
Summarizing, Figure 3 shows how   and  vary with q and è . The figure is drawn with
.
-29-Figure 3: the division of individuals between non-smokers, smokers of legal cigarettes and smokers of
illegal cigarettes as the ban in Period 2 is tightened
-30-7.  COMBINATION POLICY OF TAX AND BAN: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS
With the government policy P being its choice of q, the consumer price of cigarettes, and è, the
extent of the ban in the second period, the government’s problem is to maximize the sum of welfare from
smokers of illegal cigarettes, from smokers of legal cigarettes and from non-smokers.  We note that
without loss of generality we can restrict the government’s choice of the consumer price to be between  p
and  : if the government sets the consumer price to exceed  , no legal cigarettes are bought and it is “as
if”  .  Using Equation (3), the government’s problem is:
Instead of calculating the optimum values of q and è , we instead proceed sequentially. The
government is assumed to first choose the optimal consumer price q conditional on ;
PROPOSITION 2:  With q being set optimally conditional on è, q(è), 
PROOF: See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 is the central result of this paper. Even when the tax rate can be set optimally,
-31-welfare increases when the smoking ban in the second period is tightened from   to  . Put
differently, Proposition 2 implies that it is always desirable to have a full ban in the second period, or to
set  .
8.  DISCUSSION OF HISTORY- DEPENDENCE
In Section 2 we noted that addiction has both long-term and short-term aspects. Our model
focuses on short-run addiction and is static. The long-term addictive properties of smoking imply that an
individual’s smoking taste at time T is heavily dependent on his smoking history. We interpret the state
variable  to be the accumulated stock of cigarettes smoked prior to time T ; increasing 
increases the smoker’s taste for cigarettes at time T and lowers his health.  We suggested that this should
be modeled by making the taste parameters a and b, and the health parameters s and t increasing
functions of  . We note in passing that any policy that lowers the cigarettes smoked at time T
lowers future values of the accumulated stock, thereby lowering    and long-run addiction.
Put differently, a policy which lowers smoking in the short-run will do likewise in the long-run.  
9. CONCLUSION
We have considered how government intervention can limit the consumption of a product that it
perceives is injurious to health and in addition has addictive properties - in this case cigarettes. Addiction
takes the form of a strong preference for an even consumption flow during any time period and the
injurious nature of the product is underestimated by those who consume it. The (paternalist) government
is limited in its ability to set tax rates punitively because of the availability of an illegal market where
consumers can purchase the product untaxed, but incur a (fixed) cost in doing so. We show that a ban on
the consumption of the product during part of the day, because it increases the individual’s variance in
-32-consumption, induces the individual to lower his total consumption of the product. In addition, although
the ban makes the individual worse off, welfare as calculated by the government increases. By showing
that a tax plus a ban is the best policy, we hope this finding adds to the “price v. quantity” debate on how
to best control socially undesirable activities. The model may have particular attraction in the debate over
the legalization of marijuana, where it has been proposed that high taxes and high penalties may form an
alternative policy to making the product illegal. Quantity restrictions in this context may may further
increase welfare.
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-35-1.   A notable exception is Weitzman (1974).
2. In Canada the presence of the illegal market accounts for at least one quarter of the
national market, and a much higher share in Quebec and Ontario. 
3. The effect of policy on  and long-run addiction is discussed in Section 8.
1 3 2 4. If c  and c  were increased to fully offset the fall in c , health would be unchanged but the
variance would be increased, implying that the smoker would want to lower consumption.
5. Introducing a fixed cost of smoking would lead a ban to cause some smokers to quit (the
critical value of  decreases.
ENDNOTES
-36-APPENDIX A: PROOF OF PROPOSITION A
With no ban and no cigarette tax ( R= 0) , the welfare of a smoker as calculated by the government is:
.  
With a ban, the welfare of the smoker as calculated by the government is:
-37-where the variance is calculated setting  and  .  The ban increases the welfare of the
individual as calculated by the government as:
We note that, when b = 0,  .
And
-38-             
                                                    
          
       
         > 0
where the last inequality follows from:  a - s - p < 0; we are considering a smoker or 
-39-a - (1 + á) s - p > 0  and 
i
and the last inequality follows that fact that for a smoker  .
-40-APPENDIX B: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
.
To evaluate  we use the envelope condition:
         
   
   
where we note   is a function of q but not of   per se, and hence  .
Evaluating each term: 
(1)  the contribution to welfare for the smoker of illegal cigarettes is:
      :    
-41-.
     This can be simplified to
      : 
        
(2)   The contribution to welfare from the smoker of legal cigarettes is
         
-42-.
     Differentiating with respect to è and rearranging
       
   
   
(3)To determine  . Substituting for  and  to
determine , and for   and  to determine , we determine after
rearrangement
          
 .
-43-(4)  The non-smoker is affected by the change in  only because the size of his transfer R is affected:
      
Hence:
  
   
   
  
-44-    .
     But with the population normalized to unity,
     Tax revenue is:
     and hence
 .
    Substituting into dW(è)/dè and rearranging terms: 
 
    
-45-   
                                                .
 .
We can sign this as:
1. Knowing that     implies    and that
; in addition we know  . Hence the first integral is
-46-negative.
2.   Combine the second and third integrals:
 
  
      This is negative because    implies that   and that
       , and in addition we know that   .
3.   Combine the last terms:
             
-47-.
But we know that  ; and q > p implies that
; and  . Hence each term in the brackets is
negative. In addition,  so that the whole term is negative.
     Summarizing,
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